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A B S T R A C T
Research on European legislative decision-making has
entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative
approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allow-
ing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multi-
ple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the
quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a
number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive
source for legislative information, and case-level data are not
directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to
identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data
source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly avail-
able EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a
less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We
find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas
PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative
process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particu-
lar advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be
better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.
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Legislative studies in the European Union
Research on legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU) has
entered the stage of quantitative analysis, and this step promises to advance
the current dialogue by evaluating and controlling for competing approaches
(Jupille et al., 2003: 29).1 After numerous case studies and intense theoretical
debates, rich and systematic data analyses on the process of legislative
decision-making may help in answering some of the most important ques-
tions raised in the controversies between rational choice analysts (Moravcsik,
1998; Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001) and constructivists (Checkel, 2001;
Risse, 2000), between cooperative (Felsenthal and Machover, 2001; Hosli,
2000) and non-cooperative game theorists (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001;
Steunenberg et al., 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), and among rational
choice scholars themselves (Crombez, 1996, 2000; Moser, 1996; Steunenberg,
1994; Tsebelis, 1994, 2002). Has the EU moved towards majority voting, and
to what extent does the European Parliament (EP) influence legislative
decision-making? And what are the crucial factors influencing the process
and outcomes – is the number of veto players decisive, or do we have to take
other factors into account such as the kind of legislative instrument, the policy
sector, the packaging or even the sequencing of proposals?
The legislative arena is the centre of European integration as the
Commission, the member states and the EP adopt binding decisions that
affect the lives of roughly 450 million citizens. Numerous legislative studies
ask how EU institutions matter for these decisions, and whether institutional
involvement varies across policy fields and procedures. In the past 15 years
these institutional provisions have been modified several times, and the
current European constitutional debate has centred around the distribution
of voting weights, the involvement of the EP and access to the Commission
in legislative decision-making (König and Hug, 2006). Quantitative analysis
may shed light on the extent to which inter-institutional involvement and
specific procedural rules affect legislative outcomes. We may look for changes
in the application of particular procedures or voting rules in specific sectors
and identify general trends in the quantity and type of legislative decisions
over time, while considering the effects of treaty revisions and the accession
of new members.
Although we possess a great deal of theoretical insight on these effects,
the quantitative study of inter- and intra-institutional decision-making can
provide cross-sectional and intertemporal evidence for many important claims
about EU legislative processes. This evidence is not just required for EU legisla-
tive scholars. Implementation studies also suggest that the legislative process
may influence correct and timely compliance with Community directives, and
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thus, in the event of non-compliance, further infringement processes and
decisions of the European Court of Justice (Giuliani, 2003; König et al., 2005b;
Mastenbroek, 2003; Mbaye, 2001). Furthermore, the current debate on
European constitution-building needs empirical support for normative claims
about the impact of EU legislation on actors’ constitutional preferences and
the reform of the institutional framework (Tsebelis, 2005). For example, studies
on public support assume that EU legislation ‘hits home’, even though the
amount and extent of new EU legislative activities have significantly receded
in recent years (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Gabel, 1998).
We do not believe that quantitative analyses will satisfactorily answer all
of these questions or supersede further questions and debates on EU
legislative decision-making. However, considering the large number of case-
study insights, it is time for EU scholars to evaluate competing views from a
more general perspective by including cases from multiple policy domains
and over time (Franchino, 2000; Gabel et al., 2002). At the same time, we
acknowledge that the quantitative study of EU legislative decision-making
introduces a number of risks and pitfalls to which we would like to draw
particular attention. In the few available empirical studies, we find, for
example, very different reports of EU legislative activity.2 For EU scholars
interested in quantitative research, it is often difficult to identify one defini-
tive source for this information, and case-level data are not easily accessible
in a machine-readable format. Using different and sometimes incompatible
sources of information may increase confusion rather than clarifying the
different views on EU legislative research.
Our goal is to facilitate systematic research on EU legislative decision-
making. To avoid the most crucial pitfalls and to provide a reliable source of
quantitative information, we combine and evaluate the most frequently cited,
publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less
publicized but equally valuable legislative database known as PreLex. These
data sources were developed independently by the Commission and a private
provider, respectively, to fulfil different purposes; a fact that is also reflected
in their unique structures.3 Briefly stated, we find that CELEX documents
legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the
legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases – the event-
oriented CELEX and the process-oriented PreLex – has particular advantages,
and we would like to discuss which of the two might be better suited for the
quantitative analysis of specific research questions. We also evaluate the
reliability of these sources, although we would contend that most irregulari-
ties are user related.
This article presents the (dis-)similarities between CELEX and PreLex,
describing their goals and distinctive composition. For the purpose of
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comparison, we examine the period from 1984 to 2003, when the Nice Treaty
came into force. Prior to this period, the official CELEX user’s manual as well
as the minimal number of documented initiatives and adoptions suggest that
these databases are incomplete (König, 2001, 2006; König and Schulz, 1997;
Schulz and König, 2000). Our censored CELEX data set includes 11,974
Commission proposals for binding legislation initiated between 1984 and 2003,
while PreLex documents 9832 legislative processes for the same period. In the
next section, we combine the process- and event-related information contained
in both databases to cross-validate the documented cases and variables. Finally,
we present the combined data set and describe the most important variables,
such as the applied legislative procedure, the voting rule in the Council and
the sector specification. The appendices document the technical transformation
process from full-text internet resources to machine-readable data.4
PreLex – CELEX: Similarities and differences
In an effort to increase transparency in the EU legislative process, CELEX was
launched in 1980 with the goal of making full-text documents publicly access-
ible. The database is divided into 12 sectors, each devoted to a different type
of document. For example, sector 1 contains the EU treaties, sector 3 binding
and non-binding legislation, sector 5 preparatory acts of all kinds, and sector
7 national implementation measures for Community directives. All sectors
include detailed information on relevant dates, the legislative basis, the
document title and related documents. In order to construct a data set contain-
ing all Commission proposals and the subsequently adopted legislation, we
downloaded the Commission proposals in sector 5 (hereafter referred to as
CELEX5) and binding secondary legislation – decisions, regulations and
directives – in sector 3 (CELEX3).
PreLex systematically covers the period after 1976 and was designed to
monitor inter-institutional procedures. According to the PreLex Information
Guide, the database ‘follows all Commission proposals (legislative and
budgetary dossiers, conclusions of international agreements) and communi-
cations from their transmission to the Council or the EP’. The PreLex website
provides a timeline for each Commission proposal, with the dates of differ-
ent legislative and consultative stages, including references to all involved
institutional actors. In addition to detailed information on the dates of trans-
mission and adoption by different institutions, the user finds information on
the applied legislative and voting procedures, the legal basis, responsible
Directorates-General (DGs), links to all documents passed by the different
institutions, dates of all readings, the request for and decision of any concil-
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iation committee, and decisions made by the EP and the Commission at each
stage in the legislative process. Furthermore, PreLex includes identification
of each proposal as an A or B item in the Council, which indicates whether
the act was adopted at the Council meeting without debate, after an agree-
ment had already been reached within the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives (A Items), or was adopted with continued debate (B Items).5
At first glance, PreLex appears to contain more specific and policy-
relevant information for EU legislative research. In fact, only PreLex docu-
ments the entire legislative process through all relevant stages and related
institutions. CELEX, by contrast, seems to contain more detailed information
on the treaty basis and titles of both the proposals and legislative acts, but
the two CELEX data sets must be merged in order to identify the adoption
date and transposition deadlines (where applicable) of Commission propos-
als. Although the merging of adopted legislation as contained in CELEX3 and
Commission proposals documented in CELEX5 is possible, information about
inter-institutional processes, such as the involvement of a conciliation
committee in the co-decision procedure, is available only in PreLex. Further-
more, in CELEX we lack information on Commission proposals not identi-
fied in the CELEX3 data on adopted legislation (i.e. whether they were
withdrawn or rejected). CELEX, however, also contains proposals from insti-
tutions other than the Commission as well as all binding and non-binding
secondary legislation. These documents also include tertiary Commission
legislation, which is frequently initiated through Commission White and
Green papers. This suggests that using CELEX may be particularly advanta-
geous for the analysis of legislation where no inter-institutional procedure
(i.e. involvement of multiple institutions) is applicable.
For EU legislative research, we believe that a more detailed description
of the two data sets is necessary. We have worked intensively with these data
sets since the mid 1990s and have identified several advantages as well as a
few perilous pitfalls in using them. Since most of the irregularities are user
related, we hope that our experience will help EU scholars to conduct their
analyses and test their claims. Note that both data sets are missing infor-
mation for some important variables, such as the voting rule or the legisla-
tive procedure, which we may be able to supplement with information on the
legal basis. However, in order to confirm the reliability of these data and our
respective assumptions, we propose comparing these two independent online
resources, which requires noteworthy technological expertise to transform
them into a machine-readable data set. Whereas CELEX provides access to
legal documents, PreLex reconstructs the inter-institutional legislative
process; therefore, we must take different approaches in constructing compa-
rable data sets.
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CELEX
In order to transform the CELEX documentation into a machine-readable data
set, we downloaded and combined information from sectors 5 and 3. Because
different search commands and downloading dates can dramatically affect
the sample size, we describe our downloading process in the appendix.
As previously mentioned, many variables of interest for EU legislative
research are not documented in CELEX. The information on relevant dates,
policy fields and cited legal basis is extracted directly. As indicated in Table
1, the document title clearly indicates the number of actors involved in
passing the legislation (CELEX3) as well as the type of legislation. Note that,
although our search was restricted to binding secondary legislation, we
encountered a surprising number of corrigenda and tertiary Commission
legislation that, by definition, are not found in the data on Commission
proposals and amending drafts (CELEX5). Although the title of the adopted
legislation (or draft proposal in the case of pending legislation) may be used
to identify the application of co-decision, we are unable to distinguish among
the procedures classified as Council legislation.
In order to infer the specific applied legislative procedure, we used the
treaty basis. After generating a list of all treaty references mentioned in
CELEX3 and CELEX5, we identified the legislative procedure associated with
each legal base as recorded in sector 1.6 We do not differentiate between the
agreement and the consultation procedure in this analysis because both refer
to Council legislation passed without EP participation. For cases in which
several treaty articles were mentioned, or multiple procedures may apply, all
procedures were coded, and we assume application of the strictest procedure,
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Table 1 Summary of adopted legislation documented in CELEX3 (1984–2003)
Type of legislation according to document title
Council EP/
Document type Corrigenda Commission Council & EP ECB/other Total
Decision (D) 653 8666 2887 84 217 12,507
Directive (L) 903 648 879 225 2 2657
Regulation (R) 4475 17,135 6044 70 15 27,739
Total 6031 26,449 9810 379 234 42,903
Note: These data include binding secondary legislation passed between 1 January 1984 and
1 February 2003. Stricter censoring criteria will be applied in the following section. The distinction
between document types is made according to the document code provided in the CELEX
reference number: Decision (D), Directive (L), and Regulation (R).
where stricter is understood as more EP involvement. If only legislative acts
were mentioned as legal bases, we infer the applicable legislative procedure
from the cited legislation. The same assumptions apply to our coding of the
voting rule applied in the Council; the strictest rule, or the rule presenting
the highest voting hurdle, potentially prescribed in the treaty references is
assumed.7 Although information on the policy field is provided in CELEX,
we also coded the legislative basis in order to obtain a classification accord-
ing to the treaty chapters.
Several potential factors may contribute to missing values on these vari-
ables. First, only the legal references to standard EU treaties were coded. There
are 367 cases where only an article of an accession treaty is mentioned. Second,
in 214 cases no legal basis is mentioned. Finally, in 73 instances no legislative
procedure could be identified for the provided legal reference (e.g. Article 130
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community refers to the
European Central Bank). Ultimately, the applied legislative procedure and the
Council voting rule are inferred for 11,308 legal acts.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of adopted legislation according to the
year of its adoption. Most of the legislation recorded in the CELEX data set
documents regulations. The absolute amount of legislation passed each year
has declined rapidly since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993.
The sharp decline after 2002 is largely attributable to pending legislation.
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Figure 1 Distribution of adopted legislation in CELEX (1984–2003).
Notes: Illustration of data merged from CELEX5 and CELEX3 (N = 11,974). These data have been
merged and censored as described in Appendix I. This figure illustrates the subsample of adopted
legislation.
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PreLex
In contrast to CELEX, PreLex was designed to document the entire legisla-
tive process of inter-institutional legislation. The richness of these data
complicates the extraction of key characteristics, but also provides an invalu-
able insight into the complexity of Community legislative procedures. For the
CELEX data, we merged Commission proposals with referenced passed legis-
lation. This process leads to a rectangular data sheet documenting legislative
events, where each proposal (including amended proposals) is assigned to
one passed legislative act. Proposals lacking this reference remain in the data
as pending legislation. In PreLex, at least seven unique legislative paths are
documented. Table 2 reveals that, although over 82% of the legislation docu-
mented in PreLex involves one proposal being passed as one legislative act
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Table 2 A typology of legislative processes identified in PreLex
Type N Details
Type 1: One proposal 7547
One adoption
Type 2: One proposal 646 235 pending
No adoption 405 withdrawn
6 not adopted
Type 3: One proposal & n amendments 1154 821 1 amendment
One adoption 320 2 amendments
9 3 amendments
4 4 amendments
Type 4: One proposal & n amendments 172 108 withdrawn
No adoption 4 not adopted
60 pending
158 1 amendment
14 2 amendments
Type 5: n proposals (some with amendments) 174 174 proposals
One adoption c. 82 adopted acts
Type 6: One proposal 111 77 1:2
n adoptions 8 1:3
3 1:5
20 1:6
3 1:7–21
Type 7: One proposal & n amendments 28 20 2:2
n adoptions 2 2:3
2 3:2
2 3:3
1 4:2
1 4:3
(type 1) or one proposal still pending without reference to any amending
proposals (type 2), the remaining legislation contains multiple proposals
and/or multiple legislative acts.
For process-oriented legislative research, the PreLex data reveal how the
strategic interaction of institutional actors may result in amended proposals
(types 3, 4 and 7), package deals (type 5) or multiple legislative acts (types 6
and 7). Although this typology may not be exhaustive, and individual cases
may change their type over time as existing proposals are re-examined or
passed, this depiction illustrates how complicated legislative processes and
related documents can be identified in a manner not possible in CELEX.
One potential disadvantage in PreLex is that the treaty references, or legal
bases, are in a different and less detailed format. They are not as easily iden-
tifiable (lacking the link to the cited paragraph in the appropriate treaty
version as found in CELEX sector 1) and are not as coherently coded as in
CELEX, and the applicable treaty version is less clearly defined. Although
small coding discrepancies make automated extraction more difficult, we
transformed the identified legal bases into the CELEX format, where possible,
and coded the legislative procedure applying the same method as described
for the CELEX data set. The document number provided in PreLex is also in
a different format but is easily transformed. Since the document numbers in
both data sets appear to be based on the same general numbering scheme,
we convert these numbers to the CELEX format and rely on them as unique
case identifiers.
PreLex includes detailed information on the dates and decisions made in
course of the legislative process, such as the decision of the EP after its first
reading. A further set of variables is of special interest because this infor-
mation can be obtained only indirectly in CELEX, or sometimes not at all.
These variables are the documented legislative procedure, the voting rule in
the Council, the responsible Directorate-General and the Council OJ item (the
Council agenda item as documented in the Official Journal). As can be seen in
Table 3, only 0.4% of all cases fail to mention information on the Council OJ
item where we would expect it. Unfortunately, a much higher percentage of
information on the procedure and voting rule variables is either not available
or missing.8
Another defining characteristic concerns the responsibility of the
Commission’s DG. Table 4 shows the type and amount of adopted legislation
for which selected DGs were responsible. If no adopted document is given,
we differentiate between pending, withdrawn or rejected proposals and cases
where an adopted document would be expected based on the events docu-
mented in PreLex (such as ‘formal adoption by Council’) but was not
mentioned.
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Although PreLex may be of particular interest for scholars studying the
EU legislative process and inter-institutional interaction, we find many
missing values on key variables: the legislative procedure and the voting rule.
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Table 3 Council OJ item, legislative procedure and Council decision mode:
Tabulation of binding and censored PreLex data (1984–2003)
No. %
Last mentioned reference to OJ item 
OJ Council A Item 7556 76.9
OJ Council B Item 1111 11.3
Written procedure 363 3.7
Not available where expecteda 41 0.4
Missingb 802 8.1
Total 9832 100.0
Legislative procedurec
Co-decision procedure 440 4.5
Consultation procedure 2853 29.0
Cooperation procedure 544 5.5
Agreement procedure 780 7.9
Assent procedure 133 1.4
Consultation European Central Bank 6 0.1
Social protocol 3 0.0
Not available 5073 51.6
Total 9832 100.0
Council decision mode
QMV 816 8.3
Unanimity 901 9.2
Written procedure 76 0.8
Not available 1339 13.6
Missing 6700 68.1
Total 9832 100.0
Notes: 
a This category identifies the cases where this information should have been provided (based on
the elected legislative procedure), but was not. For example, the formal adoption by the Council is
documented but no information was provided on the relevant OJ Council item.
b For these cases, we would not have expected an OJ Council item to be mentioned, owing to the
elected procedure; however, despite not having encountered such a case in repeated sampling,
we cannot fully exclude the possibility of minor program errors.
c In addition to the common legislative procedures, PreLex also documents an ‘agreement
procedure’. This legislation is linked to proposals of decisions or regulations of the Council in the
field of agreements and cites article 133 (Amsterdam consolidated version, previously article 113)
as the legislative basis. In many cases an additional reference is made to article 300, paragraphs 1
and 2 (Amsterdam consolidated version). From these treaty references and the PreLex
documentation, it may be assumed that the EP is not actively involved in the adoption of these
proposals.
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For policy studies, however, PreLex provides specific information on the
primarily and jointly responsible DG. Agriculture, trade, taxation and
customs union as well as internal market dominate the Community’s legisla-
tive activities. As the previous results in CELEX suggest, most Commission
proposals are passed as regulations. Decisions and directives are adopted less
frequently, but this trend is also sector dependent, with notably more direc-
tives being passed in the areas of industry and the internal market.
Combining PreLex and CELEX: Reliability of data
Although the decision to use CELEX over PreLex, or vice versa, might be
motivated by the research question at hand, the reliability of the provided
indicators may be another concern. In order to compare these indicators in
CELEX and PreLex, we merged both data sets using the initial proposal and
the first adopted document as the unique merging criteria. Owing to the
censored nature of the data, we exclude cases initiated prior to 1 January
1984 and cases passed or initiated after the coming into force of the Nice
Treaty in February 2003. Figure 2 provides an overview of the different merge
processes and the resulting number of cases. Unsurprisingly, not all legis-
lation could be identified in both data sets. One explanation for this discrep-
ancy rests in the event- vs. process-oriented designs of the respective
databases. In the following, we concentrate on the successfully merged
sample of 8475 cases and leave aside further speculation about these
discrepancies.9
Figure 2 illustrates the cases we wish to compare. Recall that, for CELEX,
we employed a two-stage process combining 13,001 Commission proposals
from CELEX5 with the 42,903 cases of adopted legislation in CELEX3.
PreLex, in contrast, documents 16,676 legislative processes, including non-
binding legislation and Commission proposals lacking the standard PC
prefix (e.g. those based on so-called SEC documents, including White and
Green papers). Censoring both data sets to include only binding legislation
for the period under study reduces the samples to 11,974 and 9832 cases,
respectively. Merging both data sets further reduces the sample to 8475 cases,
because 3499 cases from CELEX and 1357 cases from PreLex could not be
identified in the other data set. This does not necessarily suggest that CELEX
documents a more complete sample of Commission proposals than PreLex.
The difference in numbers is primarily attributed to amending proposals,
which are documented as separate cases in CELEX but are counted as one
legislative process in PreLex, and which are therefore not included in the
merged data set.
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Legislative procedure
Institutional analyses frequently focus on the impact of the legislative
procedures. Whereas the legislative procedure must be coded in CELEX, this
information is partially documented in PreLex. This is a valuable means of
testing reliability, even though we find more than 50% missing values.
According to the legal bases cited for the cases lacking a documented legisla-
tive procedure in PreLex, it is reasonable to assume no EP involvement and
that these cases were adopted by the Council under the qualified majority
(QMV) rule. Table 5 provides a comparison of the coded legislative procedure
obtained in CELEX and the information in PreLex.
According to Table 5, reliability is limited because information for a
number of cases is not available or there are coding discrepancies. This may
be a result of our choice to apply the strictest criterion for coding parlia-
mentary participation when multiple treaty articles were indicated in CELEX.
To confirm reliability, we compare the values obtained by extrapolating the
procedure from the legal basis in both data sets. Table 6 shows that we obtain
similar results. This suggests that scholars should pay careful attention to the
drawbacks of procedural indicators (e.g. missing values, assumptions, etc.).
To sum up, information on the legislative procedures is best obtained
from various sources. The coding of the legal basis leads to the least number
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CELEX5 CELEX3
42,90313,001
CELEX
13,001 16,676
PreLex
Censored (only binding) legislation
11,974 9832
135784753499
Figure 2 Overview of the data sets.
of missing values, but cross-validation with documented procedures in
PreLex reveals some discrepancies. The application of co-decision is easily
determined for adopted legislation according to the document title in CELEX;
however, when more detailed information is required (e.g. application of
consultation or cooperation procedures, particularly for pending proposals),
there may be no alternative to manually coding the legal basis.
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Table 5 Cross-tabulation of legislative procedure
Role of EP (CELEX)
Consultation/ 
Legislative procedure no EP Not
(PreLex) involvement Cooperation Co-decision identified Total
Consultation procedure 2194 32 221 76 2523
Cooperation procedure 249 167 59 21 496
Co-decision procedure 122 9 220 3 354
Agreement 502 1 49 0 552
Assent procedure 35 1 57 0 93
Consultation ECB/Social 6 0 0 0 6
protocol
Not available 3865 32 70 484 4451
Total 6973 242 676 584 8475
Notes: Tabulation of successfully merged binding and censored PreLex and CELEX data (1984–2003). EP
involvement is coded according to the mentioned treaty basis in CELEX and cross-tabulated with the
procedure documented in PreLex. We again include the agreement procedure as documented in PreLex
(refer to Table 3).
Table 6 Legislative procedure inferred using the cited legal basis: A comparison of
PreLex and CELEX
Role of EP according to treaty basis (CELEX)
Role of EP according to Consultation/ Not 
treaty basis (PreLex) no involvement Cooperation Co-decision identified Total
Consultation/no 4194 66 259 27 4546
involvement
Cooperation 230 134 45 18 427
Co-decision 83 3 298 1 385
Not identified 2466 39 74 538 3117
Total 6973 242 676 584 8475
Voting rule in the Council
In addition to the legislative procedure, other studies also focus on the applied
Council voting rule. Table 7 shows the cross-tabulation of the indicator in
PreLex and the extrapolated reference to the voting rule in CELEX. The results
reveal an underestimation of the application of unanimity: 55% of the cases
documented in PreLex as unanimity are classified as QMV in CELEX. Owing
to the phrasing of the treaties, the voting rule is more difficult to deduce from
the legal basis than is the legislative procedure. As with the legislative
procedure, the high number of missing values compels both PreLex and
CELEX users to code the legal basis manually if information is desired on the
voting rule applied in the Council.
A comparison of the voting rule inferred from the respective legal basis
in both data sets again shows that similar results are obtained (see Table 8).
Compared with CELEX, PreLex reveals a more consensus-oriented bias
towards the unanimity rule but also contains many missing values.
Policy field
Policy studies frequently refer to the specific feature of a policy area of EU
legislative decision-making. A comparison of the listed and/or extrapolated
policy fields and the primarily responsible DGs may provide some cross-
validation. However, information on the degree to which DGs are responsible
for legislation in given policy fields is limited. In PreLex, the only information
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Table 7 Voting rule in Council: A comparison of PreLex and CELEX
Voting rule according to treaty basis (CELEX)
Last reference documented Not 
(PreLex) Unanimity QMV identified Total
Unanimity 325 469 51 845
QMV 148 587 41 776
Written procedure 6 0 0 6
Not mentioned 469 537 60 1066
Missing 1709 3641 432 5782
Total 2657 5234 584 8475
Notes: The legal basis in PreLex is not substituted if a legal act is cited. In CELEX, we have
substituted these references. After repeated sampling of the cited legal bases we note, however,
that these cases are likely Council legislation approved under QMV and not subject to inter-
institutional procedures.
provided on the related policy sector is the primarily and jointly responsible
DG. In CELEX, the policy sector may be obtained by coding the legal basis
according to the treaty chapter sub-heading or from the EUROVOC classifi-
cation provided by CELEX. For a better overview, we have classified this
policy sector information into five categories. Table 9 shows the distribution
of the legislation in the eight most common DGs according to the classified
policy sector.
For research on the legislative process conducted using CELEX, it is
valuable to know that the responsible DG can be deduced relatively accu-
rately from the policy field information. This is especially true in the area of
agriculture, but may be more problematic in areas related to the common
market and industry.
Table 9 indicates that the cases in the most important policy areas largely
coincide. This does not mean that overlapping policy competencies result
only from coding. Rather, this suggests that many proposals involve multiple
competencies – a well-known problem within the Commission. For this
reason, the preparation of many proposals includes several DGs.
Conclusion
Our discussion of the data sets has shown that there are pros and cons with
both CELEX and PreLex. Using the PreLex data, we find that roughly 17% of
EU legislation cannot be easily classified in a rectangular data sheet relating
one proposal to one passed legislative act. Complicated legislative processes
are better documented in PreLex because related amending proposals and
resulting multiple acts are connected in individual cases. If, however, we want
to trace legislative events and consider amending proposals as individual
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Table 8 Voting rule in Council inferred using the cited legal basis: A comparison of
PreLex and CELEX
Voting rule according to treaty basis (CELEX)
Voting rule according to Not 
treaty basis (PreLex) Unanimity QMV identified Total
Unanimity 1161 68 23 1252
QMV 820 3263 23 4106
Not identified 676 1903 538 3117
Total 2657 5234 584 8475
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cases, CELEX may provide the more attractive structure. Either way, we have
established that many of the contradictory claims about EU legislative activity
may be reducible to the question of whether events or processes are counted.
Furthermore, we observe differences in the period and types of document
recorded in these databases.
In our view, CELEX is an integrated, highly specialized and differenti-
ated collection of legislative documents. The direct link to the full-text docu-
ments, the treaty citation and the national implementation measures are
advantageous for analysing EU legislative acts. The data also include
Commission tertiary legislation as well as corrigenda and non-binding docu-
ments. This is particularly relevant for implementation studies and those
analyses examining the possible impact of norms and informal rules imposed
by non-binding acts. However, the need to link documents and merge charac-
teristics to document legislative events may provide an additional source of
error, if not approached systematically. The tabular structure is more straight-
forward in its construction and its citation of the legal treaty basis, but the
need to code the legislative bases is a disadvantage that also persists in
PreLex.
Researchers seeking detailed information on the inter-institutional
legislative process may find PreLex more suited to their needs. Here, we have
not yet explored the information on the available dates and decisions made
at each reading, but this might prove to be a valuable task. Particularly for
those interested in the involvement of the EP, PreLex provides references to
parliamentary documents, rapporteurs and transmission dates. The unique
advantage of PreLex is that the entire inter-institutional process is docu-
mented to include all actors involved and their decisions at each legislative
stage.
Although it seems plausible to combine information from both data sets,
it should be kept in mind that some discrepancies remain, which may result
from the different purposes of these resources. As previously mentioned, the
document numbering (particularly after the hyphen) differs in some cases.
Combining the two data sets may lead to specific biases; however, missing
values can be minimized, the quality of some variables such as the voting
rule and the legislative procedure can be improved, and additional infor-
mation such as the responsible DG or related Council OJ item may be supple-
mented. We recommend using the merged data set, but we feel that the
dangers of merging data must be carefully considered, particularly for cases
involving amended proposals and/or proposals leading to multiple resulting
acts.
To promote research we have released the merged data set, although we
believe that all data sets presented are valuable assets for future quantitative
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activities. We hope that these data will help to resolve conflicts between
competing theoretical strands and aid qualitative researchers in selecting
representative legislation for their case studies. Our experience of more than
10 years of database management suggests that researchers usually make a
number of explicit and implicit decisions when extracting and coding the full-
text information. Sometimes, missing values occur because of a mishandling
of the full-text information (see, for a discussion, König et al., 2005a). Avoiding
these pitfalls is a very time-consuming process, and perhaps our release of
these data will help other scholars to save time and run their analyses on a
common and transparent ground. It is our belief that using reliable data will
support progress in EU legislative research, whether these advances are used
to develop new and better theories, to test existent theories, or to improve
legislative decision-making.
Notes
1 The merged data set presented in this contribution may be downloaded at:
http://www.dhv-speyer.de/tkoenig/.
2 Alesina et al. (2005: 291) used a CELEX search and identified 25,472 direc-
tives, regulations and decisions for the period 1986–1995. By contrast, König
(2001) refers to 5701 Commission proposals for binding secondary legislation
documented in CELEX for the period 1984–95. Although other studies also
cite legislative statistics according to CELEX, these studies illustrate the wide
range of numbers cited by researchers using the same data source. Without
easily accessible official statistics on EU legislative activity, we must ask how
these differing statistics come about. In this example, we predict that Alesina
et al. (2005) cite sector 3 CELEX data and that their numbers may include
corrigenda, Commission tertiary legislation and (possibly) duplicate cases,
whereas König (2001, 2006) as well as König and Schulz (1997) and Schulz
and König (2000) document Commission proposals.
3 CELEX, which stands for Communitatis Europae Lex, was updated on a daily
basis until January 2005, when it was integrated into the EUR-Lex frame-
work; however, for the period under study CELEX is still freely accessible at
http://europa.eu.int/celex/. PreLex is also accessible via EUR-Lex and
linked to the official European Union website at http://europa.eu.int/
prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en.
4 The appendices are available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/
issues.htm.
5 Although reference to the Council OJ items may not be the best indicator of
conflict or of divergent member state preferences, it is the only indicator docu-
mented on a case-wise basis in these data.
6 The treaty references are recorded as CELEX sector 1 document numbers and
identify individual treaty articles. In some instances reference is made to a
particular sentence within an article, but in such cases the associated legisla-
tive process is not always easily identifiable.
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7 Some may question our assumption regarding application of the strictest
procedure mentioned; however, given a list of multiple legal bases, a rule of
thumb must be defined. The appropriateness of this assumption is explored
in the merged data set. Based on Tables 6 and 7, we do not find evidence of
an overestimation of the application of unanimity.
8 Owing to the nature of the PreLex data, we suspect that these missing values
have a systematic explanation. Repeated sampling of the legal bases cited in
these cases confirms that this category largely refers to Council legislation
adopted under QMV.
9 It should be noted that several documents share the same 11-digit document
number, differing only in the sub-numbering after the hyphen, and that the
documents associated with these sub-numbers differ. After merging the
CELEX and PreLex data, we noticed that numbering schemes for proposals
after the hyphen are not identical in the two databases. Therefore, the
merging of these proposals was first done according to the 11 leading digits
and confirmed using the adopted document number. A comparison of dates
and document titles confirms this method. Unfortunately, proposals lacking
an adopted document could not be merged owing to the lack of a unique
identifier.
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